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A priori skepticism, conventionalism and contextualism
In this thesis we propose a skeptical scenario about a priori knowledge. The scenario is composed of three main arguments: the a priori brain-in-a-vat argument, the problem of deduction, and the rule–following paradox. We propose a solution for a priori skepticism that is based on two philosophical...
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| Format: | Thesis |
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AUC Knowledge Fountain
2016
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| Summary: | In this thesis we propose a skeptical scenario about a priori knowledge. The scenario is composed of three main arguments: the a priori brain-in-a-vat argument, the problem of deduction, and the rule–following paradox. We propose a solution for a priori skepticism that is based on two philosophical schools: conventionalism and contextualism. Finally, we provide a sufficient condition – although hard to satisfy – for relieving a priori skepticism. |
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