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The responsability to protect and the Uniting for Peace Resolution
The Rwanda genocide during the 1990s showed the failure of the international community to prevent mass atrocities and save civilians’ lives. The current movement toward advancing the Responsibility to Protect Resolution has grown out of recognition of the global community’s insufficient response to...
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| Format: | Thesis |
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AUC Knowledge Fountain
2013
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| Summary: | The Rwanda genocide during the 1990s showed the failure of the international community to prevent mass atrocities and save civilians’ lives. The current movement toward advancing the Responsibility to Protect Resolution has grown out of recognition of the global community’s insufficient response to the 20th century mass atrocities. As a result the concept of R2P was born during that time in order to save people from crimes against humanity and genocide. However, since the 1990s until today crimes and violence against civilians continue to occur. For example, the situation in several Arab countries and the attacks against civilians such as Libya and Syria lead us to question concepts such as the responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention. This thesis explores the concept of R2P within the UN system. This paper argues that R2P resolution should be done within the UN as it is an international organization which should have the authority to apply the concept of R2P. The problem is that within the UN Security Council the five permanent members maintain undue control because of their veto power. All countries in the UN should participate in deciding whether it is urgent and useful to intervene in a country to save its civilians or not. The thesis mainly evaluates the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a way to overcome the 5 Permanent members veto power. |
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