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Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality
Bibliography: pages 230-233.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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Department of Philosophy
2016
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| _version_ | 1867613229235044352 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Bak, Nelleke |
| author2 | Brooks, David |
| author_browse | Bak, Nelleke Brooks, David |
| author_facet | Brooks, David Bak, Nelleke |
| author_sort | Bak, Nelleke |
| collection | Thesis |
| description | Bibliography: pages 230-233. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/16339 |
| institution | University of Cape Town (South Africa) |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:32:47.627Z |
| license_str | Not specified — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateRange | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | Department of Philosophy |
| publisherStr | Department of Philosophy |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| spelling | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/16339 Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality Bak, Nelleke Brooks, David Philosophy Bibliography: pages 230-233. The problem of self-deception has been described as the paradoxical state of fooling oneself into believing what one knows to be false. The epistemological paradox of believing that p and believing that not-p, the psychological paradox of intending to do what one knows one cannot do, and the ethical paradox of being both agent and victim of one's own deception arise when self-deception is based on the structure of other-deception. Traditionally the approach to these paradoxes has been either to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is impossible and that those phenomena which we falsely call "self-deception" are merely metaphors of other-deception, or the other approach is to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, is possible with all its accompanying paradoxes. Taking as her starting point the belief that self-deception can be based on the structure of other-deception, the author aims to show that self-deception is problematic but not necessarily paradoxical and that the two traditional approaches are not necessarily exclusive. The author has placed self-deception on a sliding scale from "weak" to "hard" cases, analogous to a sliding scale of "weak" to "hard" other-deception. By means of conceptual analysis of " deception'' and the comparison and evaluation of different arguments, the author attempts to explain how self-deception, as the holding of contradictory beliefs, is possible. 2016-01-12T11:16:32Z 2016-01-12T11:16:32Z 1987 Master Thesis Masters MA http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16339 eng application/pdf Department of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities University of Cape Town |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Bak, Nelleke Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality |
| thesis_degree_str | Master's |
| title | Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality |
| title_full | Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality |
| title_fullStr | Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality |
| title_full_unstemmed | Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality |
| title_short | Philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self-deception, with specific reference to perversions of rationality |
| title_sort | philosophical problems and paradoxes in the concept of self deception with specific reference to perversions of rationality |
| topic | Philosophy |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16339 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT baknelleke philosophicalproblemsandparadoxesintheconceptofselfdeceptionwithspecificreferencetoperversionsofrationality |