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Moral reasons of our own
Includes bibliographical references
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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Department of Philosophy
2016
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| _version_ | 1867613140134395904 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Lerm, Jessica |
| author2 | Metz Thaddeus |
| author_browse | Lerm, Jessica Metz Thaddeus |
| author_facet | Metz Thaddeus Lerm, Jessica |
| author_sort | Lerm, Jessica |
| collection | Thesis |
| description | Includes bibliographical references |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/16555 |
| institution | University of Cape Town (South Africa) |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:31:24.573Z |
| license_str | Not specified — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateRange | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | Department of Philosophy |
| publisherStr | Department of Philosophy |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| spelling | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/16555 Moral reasons of our own Lerm, Jessica Metz Thaddeus Wanderer, Jeremy Galgut, Elisa Philosophy Includes bibliographical references This thesis examines the idea of the second-personal reason, as advocated by Stephen Darwall in his influential book, The Second-Person Standpoint. A second-personal reason is a reason that exists not in the world, nor in a single individual's mind, but in the relationship between two (or more) people: second-personal reasons are reasons given to a first person by a second. The idea of second-personality is gaining ground in contemporary Metaethics - as well as in Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind - and this thesis aims to give a novel presentation of Darwall's Second-Personal metaethic that makes clear just why it is so popular. As I will present it, Darwall's Second-Personal account is a fresh kind of metaethic that promises to give us the 'best of both worlds', enjoying all the benefits of traditional metaethics, such as Realism and Neo-Kantianism, while simultaneously overcoming their respective defects. However, I go on to argue that Darwall's Second-Personal account ultimately fails. Contrary to initial appearances, Darwall's Second-Personal account does not present any significant advances, and, whatever advantages it does appear to possess, it possesses only by virtue of its covert, illicit appeal to Realism. In particular, I argue that we have no grounds for believing that there are indeed such things as second-personal reasons in the first place. After all, who are you to tell me what to do? In response to this criticism, I offer a new, different reading of Darwall's Second-Personal account, according to which it is not to be read as one amongst other metaethics, such as Realism or Neo-Kantianism. It is, rather, to be read as an entirely different approach to Metaethics. Taking my inspiration from Gilbert Ryle, I cash this out in terms of the Second-Personal account's reacting to the category-mistakenness of traditional Metaethics, by reconceiving moral reasons as belonging to a different kind of category altogether. When we understand morality correctly, as belonging to its proper category, then it follows that moral reasons are indeed second-personal. They are moral reasons of our own. 2016-01-26T11:00:41Z 2016-01-26T11:00:41Z 2015 Doctoral Thesis Doctoral PhD http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16555 eng application/pdf Department of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities University of Cape Town |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Lerm, Jessica Moral reasons of our own |
| thesis_degree_str | Doctoral |
| title | Moral reasons of our own |
| title_full | Moral reasons of our own |
| title_fullStr | Moral reasons of our own |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moral reasons of our own |
| title_short | Moral reasons of our own |
| title_sort | moral reasons of our own |
| topic | Philosophy |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16555 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lermjessica moralreasonsofourown |