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In June 2004 the Department of Trade and Industry embarked on a corporate law reform process which culminated in the enactment of the Companies Act 71 2008. One of the key objectives of the reform process was to provide flexibility in the formation and management of companies. As part of this goal,...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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Department of Commercial Law
2017
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| Summary: | In June 2004 the Department of Trade and Industry embarked on a corporate law reform process which culminated in the enactment of the Companies Act 71 2008. One of the key objectives of the reform process was to provide flexibility in the formation and management of companies. As part of this goal, and by the use of the concept of alterable and unalterable provisions, the new Act unravelled some shareholder protective mechanisms provided for under the old Companies Act 61 of 1973. At the same time, it conferred increased powers on the board of directors of a company. These changes affect the power dynamic between shareholders and the board of directors within the company. Given the significant role of directors within the company, these changes give rise to concerns about shareholder protection, especially in the light of the conduct of directors in corporate scandals of the recent past. The objective of this thesis is to show where there has been a shift in the balance of power between shareholders and the board of directors and, how this shift affects shareholder protection and, whether the shift of power has been balanced by increased shareholder protection. |
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