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The ownership and control architecture of South Africa's state-owned companies and its impact on corporate governance

The thesis examines the ownership model and various control arrangements of state-owned companies (SOCs) to establish how the division of corporate power between the boards of directors and shareholder-representatives and the exercise of corporate power by these organs impact corporate governance. T...

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Main Author: Thabane, Tebello
Other Authors: Ncube, Caroline
Format: Thesis
Language:English
Published: Department of Commercial Law 2021
Subjects:
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access_status_str Open Access
author Thabane, Tebello
author2 Ncube, Caroline
author_browse Ncube, Caroline
Thabane, Tebello
author_facet Ncube, Caroline
Thabane, Tebello
author_sort Thabane, Tebello
collection Thesis
description The thesis examines the ownership model and various control arrangements of state-owned companies (SOCs) to establish how the division of corporate power between the boards of directors and shareholder-representatives and the exercise of corporate power by these organs impact corporate governance. The thesis makes several claims. First, it argues that the architecture of ownership and control is not underpinned by a sound theoretical base and lacks a clear and consistent economic and political logic. Second, the motivations for state ownership are vague and contradictory, resulting in an irrationally amorphous ownership model. Third, shareholder control powers are excessive, often abused, and lead to shareholder proximity to the locus of governance, which engenders interference and erodes boards' autonomy and authority to govern effectively. Fourth, the legal and regulatory regime governing SOCs is plural, complex, fragmented, and contradictory. Collectively, these and other conceptual flaws have an adverse impact on governance. To address the flaws, the true nature and role of SOCs as entities of a special kind designed to fulfil an overarching public interest mandate need to be reimagined. To realise the public interest mandate, SOCs must be governed in the public interest. This has several aspects. The first is the truncation of excessive shareholder powers and the elimination of interference by removing SOCs from direct political control and placing them under an independent and professional shareholder entity akin to Singapore's state holding company, Temasek. The second aspect is a rethink and expansion of the duties of SOCs' directors by introducing a novel duty to act in the public interest, in addition to their traditional duties. The third aspect is that the legal and regulatory framework must be de-layered, responsive, and complementary to accommodate and give impetus to the public interest approach to corporate governance. Ultimately, these changes must culminate in a nuanced and bespoke architecture of ownership and control that is minimalist and structured and that can, arguably, address the idiosyncratic governance challenges that confront South African SOCs.
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institution University of Cape Town (South Africa)
language eng
last_indexed 2026-06-10T12:33:19.547Z
license_str Not specified — see source repository
provenance_str_mv Harvested via OAI-PMH from UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository
publishDate 2021
publishDateRange 2021
publishDateSort 2021
publisher Department of Commercial Law
publisherStr Department of Commercial Law
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source_str UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository
spelling oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/33992 The ownership and control architecture of South Africa's state-owned companies and its impact on corporate governance Thabane, Tebello Ncube, Caroline Idensohn, Kathleen Commercial Law The thesis examines the ownership model and various control arrangements of state-owned companies (SOCs) to establish how the division of corporate power between the boards of directors and shareholder-representatives and the exercise of corporate power by these organs impact corporate governance. The thesis makes several claims. First, it argues that the architecture of ownership and control is not underpinned by a sound theoretical base and lacks a clear and consistent economic and political logic. Second, the motivations for state ownership are vague and contradictory, resulting in an irrationally amorphous ownership model. Third, shareholder control powers are excessive, often abused, and lead to shareholder proximity to the locus of governance, which engenders interference and erodes boards' autonomy and authority to govern effectively. Fourth, the legal and regulatory regime governing SOCs is plural, complex, fragmented, and contradictory. Collectively, these and other conceptual flaws have an adverse impact on governance. To address the flaws, the true nature and role of SOCs as entities of a special kind designed to fulfil an overarching public interest mandate need to be reimagined. To realise the public interest mandate, SOCs must be governed in the public interest. This has several aspects. The first is the truncation of excessive shareholder powers and the elimination of interference by removing SOCs from direct political control and placing them under an independent and professional shareholder entity akin to Singapore's state holding company, Temasek. The second aspect is a rethink and expansion of the duties of SOCs' directors by introducing a novel duty to act in the public interest, in addition to their traditional duties. The third aspect is that the legal and regulatory framework must be de-layered, responsive, and complementary to accommodate and give impetus to the public interest approach to corporate governance. Ultimately, these changes must culminate in a nuanced and bespoke architecture of ownership and control that is minimalist and structured and that can, arguably, address the idiosyncratic governance challenges that confront South African SOCs. 2021-09-21T20:06:47Z 2021-09-21T20:06:47Z 2021 2021-09-21T20:05:56Z Doctoral Thesis Doctoral PhD http://hdl.handle.net/11427/33992 eng application/pdf Department of Commercial Law Faculty of Law
spellingShingle Commercial Law
Thabane, Tebello
The ownership and control architecture of South Africa's state-owned companies and its impact on corporate governance
thesis_degree_str Doctoral
title The ownership and control architecture of South Africa's state-owned companies and its impact on corporate governance
title_full The ownership and control architecture of South Africa's state-owned companies and its impact on corporate governance
title_fullStr The ownership and control architecture of South Africa's state-owned companies and its impact on corporate governance
title_full_unstemmed The ownership and control architecture of South Africa's state-owned companies and its impact on corporate governance
title_short The ownership and control architecture of South Africa's state-owned companies and its impact on corporate governance
title_sort ownership and control architecture of south africa s state owned companies and its impact on corporate governance
topic Commercial Law
url http://hdl.handle.net/11427/33992
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