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Auctions and mechanism design for decentralized marketplaces
Those that come up with commercially viable ideas are often not the best suited to implement them. This can lead to allocational inefficacy in the deployment of good ideas. The transfer or licensing of patents is a means of commercializing ideas. However, in the current patent market, the idea selle...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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Graduation School of Business
2022
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| _version_ | 1867614294361767936 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Maree, Christopher |
| author2 | Georg, Co-Pierre |
| author_browse | Georg, Co-Pierre Maree, Christopher |
| author_facet | Georg, Co-Pierre Maree, Christopher |
| author_sort | Maree, Christopher |
| collection | Thesis |
| description | Those that come up with commercially viable ideas are often not the best suited to implement them. This can lead to allocational inefficacy in the deployment of good ideas. The transfer or licensing of patents is a means of commercializing ideas. However, in the current patent market, the idea seller and the idea buyer often don't match which results in the proliferation of adverse selection. This thesis examines the existing patent market and finds many examples of opacity. Pitfalls abound for both sellers and buyers which result in inefficiencies when attempting to find the best fit for seller and buyer. Improvements in allocating ideas to the best implementers would help inventors and companies alike. Brilliant ideas are frequently generated from universities. This thesis presents a means to commercialize these ideas by issuing licenses on the blockchain in an innovative marketplace for ideas. This commercialization of ideas generates funds that support the institution that originally conceived the ideas and indirectly supports foundational research. The marketplace for ideas is based on sealed bid auctions which ensure that the company that values the idea the most is allocated the license. An optional Harberger Tax system is included to generate constant revenue for the universities from the licensed ideas. This mechanism decreases information asymmetries, increases market liquidity and provides representative license pricing. Smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum blockchain are used to eliminate auction corruption through trustless sealed bid auctions. Smart contracts also automate license issuance, payments and act as a public ledger of license ownership and provenance. A full front-end web application is presented to interface with the marketplace for all users. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/35852 |
| institution | University of Cape Town (South Africa) |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:49:45.486Z |
| license_str | Not specified — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateRange | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Graduation School of Business |
| publisherStr | Graduation School of Business |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| spelling | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/35852 Auctions and mechanism design for decentralized marketplaces Maree, Christopher Georg, Co-Pierre business Those that come up with commercially viable ideas are often not the best suited to implement them. This can lead to allocational inefficacy in the deployment of good ideas. The transfer or licensing of patents is a means of commercializing ideas. However, in the current patent market, the idea seller and the idea buyer often don't match which results in the proliferation of adverse selection. This thesis examines the existing patent market and finds many examples of opacity. Pitfalls abound for both sellers and buyers which result in inefficiencies when attempting to find the best fit for seller and buyer. Improvements in allocating ideas to the best implementers would help inventors and companies alike. Brilliant ideas are frequently generated from universities. This thesis presents a means to commercialize these ideas by issuing licenses on the blockchain in an innovative marketplace for ideas. This commercialization of ideas generates funds that support the institution that originally conceived the ideas and indirectly supports foundational research. The marketplace for ideas is based on sealed bid auctions which ensure that the company that values the idea the most is allocated the license. An optional Harberger Tax system is included to generate constant revenue for the universities from the licensed ideas. This mechanism decreases information asymmetries, increases market liquidity and provides representative license pricing. Smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum blockchain are used to eliminate auction corruption through trustless sealed bid auctions. Smart contracts also automate license issuance, payments and act as a public ledger of license ownership and provenance. A full front-end web application is presented to interface with the marketplace for all users. 2022-02-25T12:27:11Z 2022-02-25T12:27:11Z 2021 2022-02-25T12:26:53Z Master Thesis Masters MPhil http://hdl.handle.net/11427/35852 eng application/pdf Graduation School of Business Graduate School of Business |
| spellingShingle | business Maree, Christopher Auctions and mechanism design for decentralized marketplaces |
| thesis_degree_str | Master's |
| title | Auctions and mechanism design for decentralized marketplaces |
| title_full | Auctions and mechanism design for decentralized marketplaces |
| title_fullStr | Auctions and mechanism design for decentralized marketplaces |
| title_full_unstemmed | Auctions and mechanism design for decentralized marketplaces |
| title_short | Auctions and mechanism design for decentralized marketplaces |
| title_sort | auctions and mechanism design for decentralized marketplaces |
| topic | business |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/11427/35852 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mareechristopher auctionsandmechanismdesignfordecentralizedmarketplaces |