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How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals?

The overwhelming majority of deaths that occur on Earth are nonhuman animal deaths. This dissertation addresses the underexplored question of whether death is bad for nonhuman animals, and if so, then how bad it is. I start by asking whether death can be bad for nonhuman animals given what we common...

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Main Author: Fuller, Jamie
Other Authors: Benatar, David
Format: Thesis
Language:English
Published: Department of Philosophy 2023
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access_status_str Open Access
author Fuller, Jamie
author2 Benatar, David
author_browse Benatar, David
Fuller, Jamie
author_facet Benatar, David
Fuller, Jamie
author_sort Fuller, Jamie
collection Thesis
description The overwhelming majority of deaths that occur on Earth are nonhuman animal deaths. This dissertation addresses the underexplored question of whether death is bad for nonhuman animals, and if so, then how bad it is. I start by asking whether death can be bad for nonhuman animals given what we commonly think makes death bad for humans. According to the Deprivation Account, death is bad if it deprives its victim of future goods. Since nonhuman animals can be deprived by death of future goods, this standard account of death's badness applies to them. Next, I ask how bad death is for nonhuman animals. I present the Life Comparative Account and the Time-Relative Interest Account as two extensions of the Deprivation Account. It follows from both accounts, that while death is usually worse for humans, some nonhuman animals are harmed more by their death. Finally, I address objections from philosophers who dispute that death can be bad for nonhuman animals at all. According to Christopher Belshaw and David Velleman something in addition to deprivation is necessary for death to be bad, and nonhuman animals lack the capacity to satisfy this additional condition. Christopher Belshaw claims that the additional condition is a categorical desire at the time of death and David Velleman argues that it is an autobiographical sense of self. I reject both philosopher's arguments. In so doing, I defend the common view that death is bad if it deprives its victim of future goods, combined with the Time Relative Interest Account, which measures this deprivation from the perspective of the victim at death. I conclude by highlighting the normative implications of my findings that death can be (very) bad for nonhuman animals, as well as by pointing out how my question can be taken further.
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provenance_str_mv Harvested via OAI-PMH from UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository
publishDate 2023
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spelling oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/37320 How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals? Fuller, Jamie Benatar, David Philosophy The overwhelming majority of deaths that occur on Earth are nonhuman animal deaths. This dissertation addresses the underexplored question of whether death is bad for nonhuman animals, and if so, then how bad it is. I start by asking whether death can be bad for nonhuman animals given what we commonly think makes death bad for humans. According to the Deprivation Account, death is bad if it deprives its victim of future goods. Since nonhuman animals can be deprived by death of future goods, this standard account of death's badness applies to them. Next, I ask how bad death is for nonhuman animals. I present the Life Comparative Account and the Time-Relative Interest Account as two extensions of the Deprivation Account. It follows from both accounts, that while death is usually worse for humans, some nonhuman animals are harmed more by their death. Finally, I address objections from philosophers who dispute that death can be bad for nonhuman animals at all. According to Christopher Belshaw and David Velleman something in addition to deprivation is necessary for death to be bad, and nonhuman animals lack the capacity to satisfy this additional condition. Christopher Belshaw claims that the additional condition is a categorical desire at the time of death and David Velleman argues that it is an autobiographical sense of self. I reject both philosopher's arguments. In so doing, I defend the common view that death is bad if it deprives its victim of future goods, combined with the Time Relative Interest Account, which measures this deprivation from the perspective of the victim at death. I conclude by highlighting the normative implications of my findings that death can be (very) bad for nonhuman animals, as well as by pointing out how my question can be taken further. 2023-03-07T11:23:12Z 2023-03-07T11:23:12Z 2022 2023-02-20T12:46:06Z Master Thesis Masters MA http://hdl.handle.net/11427/37320 eng application/pdf Department of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities
spellingShingle Philosophy
Fuller, Jamie
How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals?
thesis_degree_str Master's
title How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals?
title_full How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals?
title_fullStr How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals?
title_full_unstemmed How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals?
title_short How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals?
title_sort how bad if at all is death for nonhuman animals
topic Philosophy
url http://hdl.handle.net/11427/37320
work_keys_str_mv AT fullerjamie howbadifatallisdeathfornonhumananimals