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The overwhelming majority of deaths that occur on Earth are nonhuman animal deaths. This dissertation addresses the underexplored question of whether death is bad for nonhuman animals, and if so, then how bad it is. I start by asking whether death can be bad for nonhuman animals given what we common...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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Department of Philosophy
2023
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| _version_ | 1867611281733713920 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Fuller, Jamie |
| author2 | Benatar, David |
| author_browse | Benatar, David Fuller, Jamie |
| author_facet | Benatar, David Fuller, Jamie |
| author_sort | Fuller, Jamie |
| collection | Thesis |
| description | The overwhelming majority of deaths that occur on Earth are nonhuman animal deaths. This dissertation addresses the underexplored question of whether death is bad for nonhuman animals, and if so, then how bad it is. I start by asking whether death can be bad for nonhuman animals given what we commonly think makes death bad for humans. According to the Deprivation Account, death is bad if it deprives its victim of future goods. Since nonhuman animals can be deprived by death of future goods, this standard account of death's badness applies to them. Next, I ask how bad death is for nonhuman animals. I present the Life Comparative Account and the Time-Relative Interest Account as two extensions of the Deprivation Account. It follows from both accounts, that while death is usually worse for humans, some nonhuman animals are harmed more by their death. Finally, I address objections from philosophers who dispute that death can be bad for nonhuman animals at all. According to Christopher Belshaw and David Velleman something in addition to deprivation is necessary for death to be bad, and nonhuman animals lack the capacity to satisfy this additional condition. Christopher Belshaw claims that the additional condition is a categorical desire at the time of death and David Velleman argues that it is an autobiographical sense of self. I reject both philosopher's arguments. In so doing, I defend the common view that death is bad if it deprives its victim of future goods, combined with the Time Relative Interest Account, which measures this deprivation from the perspective of the victim at death. I conclude by highlighting the normative implications of my findings that death can be (very) bad for nonhuman animals, as well as by pointing out how my question can be taken further. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/37320 |
| institution | University of Cape Town (South Africa) |
| language | eng |
| license_str | Not specified — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateRange | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | Department of Philosophy |
| publisherStr | Department of Philosophy |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| spelling | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/37320 How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals? Fuller, Jamie Benatar, David Philosophy The overwhelming majority of deaths that occur on Earth are nonhuman animal deaths. This dissertation addresses the underexplored question of whether death is bad for nonhuman animals, and if so, then how bad it is. I start by asking whether death can be bad for nonhuman animals given what we commonly think makes death bad for humans. According to the Deprivation Account, death is bad if it deprives its victim of future goods. Since nonhuman animals can be deprived by death of future goods, this standard account of death's badness applies to them. Next, I ask how bad death is for nonhuman animals. I present the Life Comparative Account and the Time-Relative Interest Account as two extensions of the Deprivation Account. It follows from both accounts, that while death is usually worse for humans, some nonhuman animals are harmed more by their death. Finally, I address objections from philosophers who dispute that death can be bad for nonhuman animals at all. According to Christopher Belshaw and David Velleman something in addition to deprivation is necessary for death to be bad, and nonhuman animals lack the capacity to satisfy this additional condition. Christopher Belshaw claims that the additional condition is a categorical desire at the time of death and David Velleman argues that it is an autobiographical sense of self. I reject both philosopher's arguments. In so doing, I defend the common view that death is bad if it deprives its victim of future goods, combined with the Time Relative Interest Account, which measures this deprivation from the perspective of the victim at death. I conclude by highlighting the normative implications of my findings that death can be (very) bad for nonhuman animals, as well as by pointing out how my question can be taken further. 2023-03-07T11:23:12Z 2023-03-07T11:23:12Z 2022 2023-02-20T12:46:06Z Master Thesis Masters MA http://hdl.handle.net/11427/37320 eng application/pdf Department of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Fuller, Jamie How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals? |
| thesis_degree_str | Master's |
| title | How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals? |
| title_full | How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals? |
| title_fullStr | How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals? |
| title_full_unstemmed | How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals? |
| title_short | How bad, if at all, is death for nonhuman animals? |
| title_sort | how bad if at all is death for nonhuman animals |
| topic | Philosophy |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/11427/37320 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fullerjamie howbadifatallisdeathfornonhumananimals |