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Before South Africa's current constitutional dispensation, the apartheid government, through its parliamentary sovereignty mode of governance, did very little to ensure accountability and oversight of the Executive branch of government. As a result, the Executive was able to establish what has been...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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Department of Public Law
2025
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| _version_ | 1867613282987147264 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Davids, Kirsten |
| author2 | Calland, Richard |
| author_browse | Calland, Richard Davids, Kirsten |
| author_facet | Calland, Richard Davids, Kirsten |
| author_sort | Davids, Kirsten |
| collection | Thesis |
| description | Before South Africa's current constitutional dispensation, the apartheid government, through its parliamentary sovereignty mode of governance, did very little to ensure accountability and oversight of the Executive branch of government. As a result, the Executive was able to establish what has been called a culture of authority. The advent of the Constitution, which entrenches the rule of law, a separation of powers doctrine, and the principle of legality, seeks to do away with the culture of authority and entrench a culture of 'justification'. However, to the extent that the Constitution includes clear accountability and oversight prescripts, to which all branches of government are bound, it envisages more than the idea of 'justification'. In this sense, at least, the Constitution seeks to ensure a 'culture of accountability' and oversight that ensures that certain checks and balances are in place between the different branches of government. Corruption and, specifically state capture phenomenon, are not exempt from these constitutional prescripts. This research suggests that corruption must be understood against the constitutional framework and in particular against the requirements of accountability and oversight. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/40859 |
| institution | University of Cape Town (South Africa) |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:33:40.116Z |
| license_str | Not specified — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publishDateRange | 2025 |
| publishDateSort | 2025 |
| publisher | Department of Public Law |
| publisherStr | Department of Public Law |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| spelling | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/40859 More than a ‘culture of justification': evaluating the content and importance of parliament's accountability and oversight functions in a time of state capture Davids, Kirsten Calland, Richard public law Before South Africa's current constitutional dispensation, the apartheid government, through its parliamentary sovereignty mode of governance, did very little to ensure accountability and oversight of the Executive branch of government. As a result, the Executive was able to establish what has been called a culture of authority. The advent of the Constitution, which entrenches the rule of law, a separation of powers doctrine, and the principle of legality, seeks to do away with the culture of authority and entrench a culture of 'justification'. However, to the extent that the Constitution includes clear accountability and oversight prescripts, to which all branches of government are bound, it envisages more than the idea of 'justification'. In this sense, at least, the Constitution seeks to ensure a 'culture of accountability' and oversight that ensures that certain checks and balances are in place between the different branches of government. Corruption and, specifically state capture phenomenon, are not exempt from these constitutional prescripts. This research suggests that corruption must be understood against the constitutional framework and in particular against the requirements of accountability and oversight. 2025-01-31T09:33:01Z 2025-01-31T09:33:01Z 2024 2025-01-31T09:27:54Z Thesis / Dissertation Masters LLM http://hdl.handle.net/11427/40859 eng application/pdf Department of Public Law Faculty of Law University of Cape Town |
| spellingShingle | public law Davids, Kirsten More than a ‘culture of justification': evaluating the content and importance of parliament's accountability and oversight functions in a time of state capture |
| thesis_degree_str | Master's |
| title | More than a ‘culture of justification': evaluating the content and importance of parliament's accountability and oversight functions in a time of state capture |
| title_full | More than a ‘culture of justification': evaluating the content and importance of parliament's accountability and oversight functions in a time of state capture |
| title_fullStr | More than a ‘culture of justification': evaluating the content and importance of parliament's accountability and oversight functions in a time of state capture |
| title_full_unstemmed | More than a ‘culture of justification': evaluating the content and importance of parliament's accountability and oversight functions in a time of state capture |
| title_short | More than a ‘culture of justification': evaluating the content and importance of parliament's accountability and oversight functions in a time of state capture |
| title_sort | more than a culture of justification evaluating the content and importance of parliament s accountability and oversight functions in a time of state capture |
| topic | public law |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/11427/40859 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT davidskirsten morethanacultureofjustificationevaluatingthecontentandimportanceofparliamentsaccountabilityandoversightfunctionsinatimeofstatecapture |