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Challenging challenges: a metaphysical redress of van den Haag's retributive axiom – unequal justice over equal injustice

For over thirty years Ernest van den Haag repeatedly asserted a controversial claim in favour of the death penalty. He argued that, regardless of the extent to which capital punishment sentences are unequally, arbitrarily, or even racially, maldistributed among offenders, capital punishment is alway...

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Main Author: Traub, Craig Michael
Other Authors: Van der Spuy, Elrena
Format: Thesis
Language:English
English
Published: Institute of Criminology 2026
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access_status_str Open Access
author Traub, Craig Michael
author2 Van der Spuy, Elrena
author_browse Traub, Craig Michael
Van der Spuy, Elrena
author_facet Van der Spuy, Elrena
Traub, Craig Michael
author_sort Traub, Craig Michael
collection Thesis
description For over thirty years Ernest van den Haag repeatedly asserted a controversial claim in favour of the death penalty. He argued that, regardless of the extent to which capital punishment sentences are unequally, arbitrarily, or even racially, maldistributed among offenders, capital punishment is always a morally valid sentence in se. His controversial claim is rooted in the theory of retributive justice, as he appeals to the offender's individual moral desert to justify capital punishment for the crime of (first-degree) murder. Thus, van den Haag summarised his claim into a logical axiom - that unequal justice (i.e. capital punishment) is always preferable to equal injustice (i.e. abolitionism or life imprisonment). Van den Haag challenged abolitionists to refute his axiom by using his same retributive foundation. This is something abolitionists have been unable to do without resorting to consequentialist or hybrid reasoning. This theoretical dissertation has sought to find the flaws in van den Haag's logic and dispute his axiom on his own retributive grounds utilising, particularly, racial maldistribution of capital sentences. In this dissertation four attempts are made to dispute his axiom and the following arguments are identified: (i) an internal inconsistency within van den Haag's axiom; (ii) an argument for an implicit illegitimate authority, as well as (iii) an argument for an explicit illegitimate authority; and finally, (iv) an argument concerning the subjective experience of the offender when presented with a sentence of death. It is, however, the final argument that carries the most weight in disputing van den Haag's axiom. Thus, this dissertation has met his challenge by rendering the death penalty immoral in itself, even when the justification for the death penalty is retributive.
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spelling oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/43139 Challenging challenges: a metaphysical redress of van den Haag's retributive axiom – unequal justice over equal injustice Traub, Craig Michael Van der Spuy, Elrena Phelps, Kelly Criminology Criminal Justice For over thirty years Ernest van den Haag repeatedly asserted a controversial claim in favour of the death penalty. He argued that, regardless of the extent to which capital punishment sentences are unequally, arbitrarily, or even racially, maldistributed among offenders, capital punishment is always a morally valid sentence in se. His controversial claim is rooted in the theory of retributive justice, as he appeals to the offender's individual moral desert to justify capital punishment for the crime of (first-degree) murder. Thus, van den Haag summarised his claim into a logical axiom - that unequal justice (i.e. capital punishment) is always preferable to equal injustice (i.e. abolitionism or life imprisonment). Van den Haag challenged abolitionists to refute his axiom by using his same retributive foundation. This is something abolitionists have been unable to do without resorting to consequentialist or hybrid reasoning. This theoretical dissertation has sought to find the flaws in van den Haag's logic and dispute his axiom on his own retributive grounds utilising, particularly, racial maldistribution of capital sentences. In this dissertation four attempts are made to dispute his axiom and the following arguments are identified: (i) an internal inconsistency within van den Haag's axiom; (ii) an argument for an implicit illegitimate authority, as well as (iii) an argument for an explicit illegitimate authority; and finally, (iv) an argument concerning the subjective experience of the offender when presented with a sentence of death. It is, however, the final argument that carries the most weight in disputing van den Haag's axiom. Thus, this dissertation has met his challenge by rendering the death penalty immoral in itself, even when the justification for the death penalty is retributive. 2026-04-28T10:51:45Z 2026-04-28T10:51:45Z 2009 2026-04-28T10:50:15Z Thesis / Dissertation Masters LLM http://hdl.handle.net/11427/43139 en eng application/pdf Institute of Criminology Faculty of Law University of Cape Town
spellingShingle Criminology
Criminal Justice
Traub, Craig Michael
Challenging challenges: a metaphysical redress of van den Haag's retributive axiom – unequal justice over equal injustice
thesis_degree_str Master's
title Challenging challenges: a metaphysical redress of van den Haag's retributive axiom – unequal justice over equal injustice
title_full Challenging challenges: a metaphysical redress of van den Haag's retributive axiom – unequal justice over equal injustice
title_fullStr Challenging challenges: a metaphysical redress of van den Haag's retributive axiom – unequal justice over equal injustice
title_full_unstemmed Challenging challenges: a metaphysical redress of van den Haag's retributive axiom – unequal justice over equal injustice
title_short Challenging challenges: a metaphysical redress of van den Haag's retributive axiom – unequal justice over equal injustice
title_sort challenging challenges a metaphysical redress of van den haag s retributive axiom unequal justice over equal injustice
topic Criminology
Criminal Justice
url http://hdl.handle.net/11427/43139
work_keys_str_mv AT traubcraigmichael challengingchallengesametaphysicalredressofvandenhaagsretributiveaxiomunequaljusticeoverequalinjustice