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Insights into moral hazard and adverse selection in the South African public sector
Mini Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2025.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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University of Pretoria
2026
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| _version_ | 1867613682671812608 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author2 | Bussin, Mark |
| author_browse | Bussin, Mark |
| author_facet | Bussin, Mark |
| collection | Thesis |
| dc_rights_str_mv | © 2025 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the University of Pretoria. |
| description | Mini Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2025. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:repository.up.ac.za:2263/109214 |
| institution | University of Pretoria (South Africa) |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:40:01.664Z |
| license_str | Other — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from UPSpace — University of Pretoria Institutional Repository |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| publishDateRange | 2026 |
| publishDateSort | 2026 |
| publisher | University of Pretoria |
| publisherStr | University of Pretoria |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | UPSpace — University of Pretoria Institutional Repository |
| spelling | oai:repository.up.ac.za:2263/109214 Insights into moral hazard and adverse selection in the South African public sector Bussin, Mark ichelp@gibs.co.za Seloane, Mmamose UCTD Principal-agent theory Moral hazard Adverse selection Public sector governance Contract management Mini Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2025. This study investigated the manifestations and drivers of moral hazard and adverse selection within the South African public sector. The aim was to understand how these phenomena affect governance, accountability, and service delivery, particularly in the context of principal–agent relationships involving government departments, oversight bodies, and implementing agents. The study adopted a qualitative research approach, using semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, including agents, representatives from oversight bodies, and principals in various government departments. The approach was grounded in principal–agent theory, which provided a framework for analysing incentive structures, information asymmetries, and accountability mechanisms. The findings show that moral hazard is often perpetuated by weak enforcement of performance contracts and limited consequences for non-compliance. Adverse selection arises from opaque procurement processes and inadequate vetting of service providers. The findings further highlight systemic issues such as misaligned incentives, lack of transparency, and fragmented oversight, which collectively undermine effective public sector performance. The study is limited by its qualitative scope and reliance on interview data, which may not have captured the full extent of the issues across all government departments. Future research could incorporate quantitative analysis or case studies to validate and expand on these findings. There is also scope to explore comparative insights from other developing countries. The findings indicate the need for reforms in contract management and performance monitoring. The study advocates stronger institutional checks, clearer accountability frameworks, and capacity-building for oversight bodies to mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection. Improving governance mechanisms in the public sector could enhance service delivery, restore public trust, and contribute to more equitable socio-economic outcomes. The research supports policy interventions that promote ethical conduct, reduce corruption, and improve the quality of life for South African citizens. This study provides a novel empirical perspective on moral hazards and adverse selection in the South African public sector, grounded in firsthand insights from key actors. It contributes to the literature on public administration and governance by offering actionable recommendations for policy and institutional reform. Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) MBA Unrestricted Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) SDG-16: Peace, justice and strong institutions 2026-03-23T09:42:06Z 2026-03-23T09:42:06Z 2026-05-05 2025 Mini Dissertation * A2025 http://hdl.handle.net/2263/109214 en © 2025 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the University of Pretoria. application/pdf University of Pretoria |
| spellingShingle | UCTD Principal-agent theory Moral hazard Adverse selection Public sector governance Contract management Insights into moral hazard and adverse selection in the South African public sector |
| title | Insights into moral hazard and adverse selection in the South African public sector |
| title_full | Insights into moral hazard and adverse selection in the South African public sector |
| title_fullStr | Insights into moral hazard and adverse selection in the South African public sector |
| title_full_unstemmed | Insights into moral hazard and adverse selection in the South African public sector |
| title_short | Insights into moral hazard and adverse selection in the South African public sector |
| title_sort | insights into moral hazard and adverse selection in the south african public sector |
| topic | UCTD Principal-agent theory Moral hazard Adverse selection Public sector governance Contract management |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/2263/109214 |