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A Critical Enquiry into the Metaphysics for Mind Uploading
Thesis (PhD (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria 2021.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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University of Pretoria
2021
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| _version_ | 1867613548509659136 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author2 | Ruttkamp-Bloem, Emma |
| author_browse | Ruttkamp-Bloem, Emma |
| author_facet | Ruttkamp-Bloem, Emma |
| collection | Thesis |
| dc_rights_str_mv | © 2019 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the University of Pretoria. |
| description | Thesis (PhD (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria 2021. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:repository.up.ac.za:2263/79347 |
| institution | University of Pretoria (South Africa) |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:37:54.123Z |
| license_str | Other — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from UPSpace — University of Pretoria Institutional Repository |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publishDateRange | 2021 |
| publishDateSort | 2021 |
| publisher | University of Pretoria |
| publisherStr | University of Pretoria |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | UPSpace — University of Pretoria Institutional Repository |
| spelling | oai:repository.up.ac.za:2263/79347 A Critical Enquiry into the Metaphysics for Mind Uploading Ruttkamp-Bloem, Emma warbypaul1@gmail.com Warby, Paul Philosophy Thesis (PhD (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria 2021. Mind uploading is a fascinating possibility that asks us to imagine a person being instantiated in a substrate other than their biological body, such as a person continuing in a robot/computer. The current thesis takes a philosophical stance and enquires as to what the nature of minds and persons would need to be in order for such a scenario to be feasible and presented multiple realizable physicalism and psychological continuity as the two primary categories of necessary and sufficient metaphysical conditions. The thesis explores the mind within the context of the mind-body problem and presents a novel version of physicalism (multiple realizable physicalism) as the central concept amongst disparate philosophy of mind stances that would allow for the mind upload. The current thesis also introduces various concepts (e.g., nomological boundaries) and emphasised others (e.g., category mistakes) to demonstrate the feasibility of mind uploading through the argument that the mind is likely multiple realizable and of a physical substrate (multiple realizable physicalism). The current thesis then, in relation to persons, explores the persistence problem and determines that a psychological (as opposed to biological) solution is the preferred stance that would allow for mind uploading. In essence, if a person is a mind (psychology) and this mind is said to continue, then it should not matter whether the mind continues in biological body or in an alternative substrate (such as a computer). What matters is the continuity of the mind (the psychological solution). The thesis integrates multiple philosophical stances using these two primary categories of multiple realizable physicalism and psychological continuity and presents various constraints that may emerge in relation to various preferences within these two primary categories. Furthermore, the current thesis argues that a possible solution to the mind–body problem and the persistence problem may be found in identifying both the mind and the person with the processes of the substrate. In this sense, both minds and persons are not the physical substrate that instantiates these phenomena (i.e., minds and persons are not the body) but rather these phenomena (minds and persons) are the processes instantiated. A person/mind is what the body does and not the body that performs these processes. This identification of processes could in principle allow for all forms of mind uploading. In addition the current thesis presents a novel view of the self (here meaning both the mind and the person) as relating to specific types of processes (efferent processes). Philosophy PhD (Philosophy) Unrestricted 2021-04-08T09:27:56Z 2021-04-08T09:27:56Z 2021-09 2021 Thesis * http://hdl.handle.net/2263/79347 en © 2019 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the University of Pretoria. application/pdf University of Pretoria |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy A Critical Enquiry into the Metaphysics for Mind Uploading |
| title | A Critical Enquiry into the Metaphysics for Mind Uploading |
| title_full | A Critical Enquiry into the Metaphysics for Mind Uploading |
| title_fullStr | A Critical Enquiry into the Metaphysics for Mind Uploading |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Critical Enquiry into the Metaphysics for Mind Uploading |
| title_short | A Critical Enquiry into the Metaphysics for Mind Uploading |
| title_sort | critical enquiry into the metaphysics for mind uploading |
| topic | Philosophy |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/2263/79347 |