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The complementary relation between the right and the good in justice as fairness : implications for liberal democracies

Thesis (PhD (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria 2023.

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Other Authors: Lotter, H.P.P. (Hendrik Petrus Pienaar)
Format: Thesis
Language:English
Published: University of Pretoria 2023
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access_status_str Open Access
author2 Lotter, H.P.P. (Hendrik Petrus Pienaar)
author_browse Lotter, H.P.P. (Hendrik Petrus Pienaar)
author_facet Lotter, H.P.P. (Hendrik Petrus Pienaar)
collection Thesis
dc_rights_str_mv © 2023 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the University of Pretoria.
description Thesis (PhD (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria 2023.
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language English
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license_str Other — see source repository
provenance_str_mv Harvested via OAI-PMH from UPSpace — University of Pretoria Institutional Repository
publishDate 2023
publishDateRange 2023
publishDateSort 2023
publisher University of Pretoria
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spelling oai:repository.up.ac.za:2263/91482 The complementary relation between the right and the good in justice as fairness : implications for liberal democracies Lotter, H.P.P. (Hendrik Petrus Pienaar) paigebenton22@gmail.com Ruttkamp-Bloem, Emma Benton, Paige UCTD Philosophy Justice the ultimate good Moral congruence Moral development Liberal democracies Thesis (PhD (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria 2023. I claim that the revisions John Rawls made to his theory of justice—as seen in his political conception of justice as fairness in the revised edition of Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement—result in him being able to secure justice for all persons even in their private lives. Thus, I defend his theory against common communitarian and feminist criticisms, viz the lack of moral community and inability to secure justice for individuals in the private domain. I demonstrate that justice is secured from the categorical requirement that all associational life and moral doctrines must adhere to the constraints of justice, by (what Rawls terms) the indirect application of the first principle of justice. The implications of and necessity for this indirect application are precisely what I interrogate in this thesis. I suggest that this indirect application requires unconditional acknowledgement and internalisation of the values of liberty and equality (political values of the first principle) into all aspects of civil society. I claim that Rawls realised this necessity for the congruence between the moral powers of persons, the spheres of society, and the right and the good and, as such, developed a complementary relation between these three features. Coherence between these three aspects is essential; without coherence, citizens would have a split moral personality, the public and the non-public spheres would be in conflict, and the political values and the moral doctrines of individuals would undermine one another. The significance of this strict coherence is that it can ensure the adequate development of individuals’ capacity for citizenship during the three stages of moral development. This results in citizens being able to form bonds of civic friendship necessary for justice as reciprocity to be realised. Thus, in this thesis, I position my argument against theorists such as Nancy Rosenblum, who argue for a more relaxed congruence between political institutions and civil society, as according to her illiberal forms of associational life can help form the necessary bonds of love and care needed for mutual cooperation in a liberal society. In opposition to this, I claim that strict congruence is necessary; without it, a stable liberal society is not possible as the citizens would not be able to able to respect one another on free, equal, and mutually beneficial terms. I rely on Hochschild’s sociological evidence to demonstrate that civic friendship has not been developed, due to a lack of reciprocity, impacting the negative development of one’s sense of justice. I then illustrate how this lack of reciprocity is amplified by digital and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. The significance of this thesis is that I claim, firstly, Rawls’s last revisions and works before his death demonstrate that justice is a collective non-comprehensive good that results by constraining individuals’ associational life and their partial comprehensive doctrines to Rawlsian demands of justice. Thus, Rawls takes seriously the feminist and communitarian critiques he received. Secondly, I claim that this interpretation of Rawls’s theory of justice cannot be conceptualised in terms of a binary presentation of the priority of the right versus the good debate and, instead, I argue for a reconceptualisation of the priority of the right versus the good as ranges on a continuum of structural relations between the right and the good. CAIR node of the CSIR Philosophy PhD (Philosophy) Unrestricted 2023-07-17T13:51:56Z 2023-07-17T13:51:56Z 2023-09-05 2023 Thesis * S2023 http://hdl.handle.net/2263/91482 10.25403/UPresearchdata.23608269 en © 2023 University of Pretoria. All rights reserved. The copyright in this work vests in the University of Pretoria. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the University of Pretoria. application/pdf University of Pretoria
spellingShingle UCTD
Philosophy
Justice the ultimate good
Moral congruence
Moral development
Liberal democracies
The complementary relation between the right and the good in justice as fairness : implications for liberal democracies
title The complementary relation between the right and the good in justice as fairness : implications for liberal democracies
title_full The complementary relation between the right and the good in justice as fairness : implications for liberal democracies
title_fullStr The complementary relation between the right and the good in justice as fairness : implications for liberal democracies
title_full_unstemmed The complementary relation between the right and the good in justice as fairness : implications for liberal democracies
title_short The complementary relation between the right and the good in justice as fairness : implications for liberal democracies
title_sort complementary relation between the right and the good in justice as fairness implications for liberal democracies
topic UCTD
Philosophy
Justice the ultimate good
Moral congruence
Moral development
Liberal democracies
url http://hdl.handle.net/2263/91482