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Toward a naturalistically explicable folk psychology
Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2019.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | en_ZA |
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Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
2019
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| _version_ | 1867613764042358784 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Hougaard, Deryck Simon |
| author2 | De Villiers-Botha, Tanya |
| author_browse | De Villiers-Botha, Tanya Hougaard, Deryck Simon |
| author_facet | De Villiers-Botha, Tanya Hougaard, Deryck Simon |
| author_sort | Hougaard, Deryck Simon |
| collection | Thesis |
| dc_rights_str_mv | Stellenbosch University |
| description | Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2019. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/107244 |
| institution | Stellenbosch University (South Africa) |
| language | en_ZA |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:41:19.685Z |
| license_str | Other — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from SUNScholar — Stellenbosch University Repository |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateRange | 2019 |
| publishDateSort | 2019 |
| publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| publisherStr | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | SUNScholar — Stellenbosch University Repository |
| spelling | oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/107244 Toward a naturalistically explicable folk psychology Hougaard, Deryck Simon De Villiers-Botha, Tanya Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. UCTD Folk psychology Predictive processing Teleosemiotics Naturalism Ethnopsychology Philosophy of mind Propositional attitudes Mental philosophy Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2019. ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis investigates the gap between what our science says and how many theorists and everyday people have characterised how we conceive of mental states. I argue that looking at our folk psychology (FP) in light of an understanding of real-world, current science yields beneficial philosophical results. FP, in the iteration that I shall be concerned with here, refers to every person’s ability to apply reason explanations to conspecifics’ behaviour. I focus predominantly on the underlying processes that we allegedly pick out in our folk psychologising, those of beliefs and desires (the propositional attitudes). The reason for this focus lies in the gap between our intuitive beliefs and understanding of our mental processes and the picture painted by the empirical sciences. I first explore some issues concerning traditional theorising on the topic, before discussing current scientific research into pur cognitive processes in the form of predictive processing (PP) as advocated by Friston (2003, 2008, 2010), Hohwy (2013), and Clark (2016). PP depicts our brains not as passive, stimulus-driven organs, but as active constructors of our environment. An implication of this approach is that the way in which we represent the environment within our mind is different to how it is typically conceived within traditional FP. I also explore Hutto’s (2008a; Hutto & Myin 2013a, 2017) claim that our minds are wired to be attuned to the environment in terms of minimal content, which allows me to develop a minimal conception of representation in terms of content, one in which direct correspondence between mental states and the supposed representation of the environment need not obtain for the mental to do causally efficacious work. I conclude that the beliefs and desires utilised in FP are socio-cultural impositions upon the neural substrate with no counterpart in reality. This has clear implications for our understanding of how we think about mental states within the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind, if what we are aiming toward is a clarification of just what the mental is. Additionally, these new insights may ensure that the cognitive sciences are better informed about what it is that is being explained and where to focus further research concerning the mental. AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis word ondersoek ingestel na die gaping tussen huidige wetenskaplike modelle van kognisie en die alledaagse verstaan van hierdie prosesse wat deur beide leke en sommige teoretici aangehang word. Ek voer aan dat dit ons veral sal baat om ons volksielkundigevermoëns in die lig van toepaslike, onlangse wetenskaplike teorieë in heroënskou te neem. In hierdie skrywe maak ek gebruik ʼn verstaan van “volksielkunde” (VS) wat verwys na ons almal se vermoë om rede-verklarings vir ons eweknieë se optrede te bied. Ek fokus hoofsaaklik op die onderliggende kognitiewe prosesse waarna ons volksielkundige uitlatings oënskynlik verwys, te wete, onderliggende oortuigings en begeertes (proposisionele houdings). Die rede vir hierdie benadering is die gaping wat tans bestaan tussen ons intuïtiewe verstaan van hoe ons kognisie werk en die beeld wat die empiriese wetenskappe daarstel. Die doel is dus om om vas te stel hoe ons ons volkverstaan en –diskoers rondom ons verstandelike prosesse moet bejeën in die lig van hierdie nuwe wetenskaplike modelle. Eerstens word tradisionele volksielkundige teorieë bespreek en van die problematiek wat hiermee gepaardgaan uitgewys. Dan word die kontemporêre kognitiewe-wetenskaplike teorie van voorspellende verwerkings bespreek, soos voorgestel deur Friston (2003, 2008, 2010), Hohwy (2013) en Clark (2016). Die voorspellendeverwerkingsteorie beeld ons breine uit as aktiewe samestellers van ons omgewingsverstaan, eerder as die passiewe, stimulus-gedrewe organe van die tradisionele verstaan. Gevolglik blyk dit dat die wyse waarop ons kognitiewe prosesse in der werklikheid ons omgewings uitbeeld drasties verskil van die alledaagse beeld wat ons van hierdie fenomeen het. Hierdie insig ondermyn daardie kognisieteorieë wat op ons volksielkunde gebaseer is. Verder word die werk van Hutto (2008a; Hutto & Myin 2013a, 2017) gebruik om te toon hoe ons kognitiewe verwerkingsprosesse waarskynlik ingestel is op ons omgewing by wyse van minimale kognitiewe “inhoud”.. Gevolglik voer ek aan dat daar nie ʼn direkte ooreenkoms tussen ons verstandelike afbeeldings en die omgewing hoef te wees vir ons om effektief met die wêreld om te gaan nie. Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die “oortuigings” en “begeertes” van tradisionele volksielkundige teorieë niks anders is as ʼn sosiaal-kulturele konstruk nie wat nie met die neurale werklikheid ooreenstem nie. Dus, indien ons ʼn akkurate beeld van ons kognitiewe funksionering wil vestig behoort ons die gebruik van hierdie konstruksies in ons kognitiewe en filosofiese teorieë te heroorweeg. Verder kan hierdie insig ook leiding bied ten opsigte van wat presies die fokus van die kognitiewe wetenskappe behoort te wees indien ons ons werklike, onderliggende verstandelike werking wil verstaan. Masters 2019-11-21T10:06:40Z 2019-12-11T06:54:44Z 2019-11-21T10:06:40Z 2019-12-11T06:54:44Z 2019-12 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/107244 en_ZA Stellenbosch University iii, 163 pages application/pdf Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| spellingShingle | UCTD Folk psychology Predictive processing Teleosemiotics Naturalism Ethnopsychology Philosophy of mind Propositional attitudes Mental philosophy Hougaard, Deryck Simon Toward a naturalistically explicable folk psychology |
| title | Toward a naturalistically explicable folk psychology |
| title_full | Toward a naturalistically explicable folk psychology |
| title_fullStr | Toward a naturalistically explicable folk psychology |
| title_full_unstemmed | Toward a naturalistically explicable folk psychology |
| title_short | Toward a naturalistically explicable folk psychology |
| title_sort | toward a naturalistically explicable folk psychology |
| topic | UCTD Folk psychology Predictive processing Teleosemiotics Naturalism Ethnopsychology Philosophy of mind Propositional attitudes Mental philosophy |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/107244 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hougaardderycksimon towardanaturalisticallyexplicablefolkpsychology |