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The deliberate design argument for the predictive success of science
Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2023.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | en_ZA en_ZA |
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Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
2023
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| _version_ | 1867613788484665344 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Knoetze, Fred |
| author2 | De Villiers-Botha, Tanya |
| author_browse | De Villiers-Botha, Tanya Knoetze, Fred |
| author_facet | De Villiers-Botha, Tanya Knoetze, Fred |
| author_sort | Knoetze, Fred |
| collection | Thesis |
| dc_rights_str_mv | Stellenbosch University |
| description | Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2023. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/128778 |
| institution | Stellenbosch University (South Africa) |
| language | en_ZA en_ZA |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:41:42.984Z |
| license_str | Other — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from SUNScholar — Stellenbosch University Repository |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateRange | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| publisherStr | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | SUNScholar — Stellenbosch University Repository |
| spelling | oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/128778 The deliberate design argument for the predictive success of science Knoetze, Fred De Villiers-Botha, Tanya Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. Anti-realism Constructive realism Knowledge, Theory of Surrealism Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2023. ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis I offer an antirealist, non-truth-based account for the predictive success of science. This is in direct contrast to classic scientific realism, in which predictive success is attributed to the approximate truth of scientific theories. I start by giving an overview of the history of scientific realism, the role of the no-miracles argument and several critiques of scientific realism. The critiques include both traditional antirealist arguments against realism, like the underdetermination of theory by evidence, and more contemporary critiques like the base-rate fallacy. Following these critiques, I begin to lay out an alternative to a truth-based account for predictive success. Instead of focusing on the approximate truth of our theories I suggest that the scientific method itself acts as a kind of cognitive tool. I define what a cognitive tool is and how it might develop at the hand of three theories: radical constructivism, evolutionary epistemology, and pragmatism. I argue that the scientific method as a cognitive tool is aimed at not delivering approximately true theories, but rather at delivering theories that enable us to reliably causally influence the external world. Having established a potential alternative account for the predictive success of science, I elaborate on what I call the deliberate-design argument. I distinguish this from other antirealist explanations, specifically van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and surrealism. I then establish the metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic stances of this explanation for predictive success. Metaphysically, I argue that the mind-independent world is primarily causally accessible. Epistemically, I argue that we can know our theories can lead to predictive success but not that they are approximately true. Semantically, I argue that the primary purpose of theories is to provide reproducible steps for the successful causal influence of external reality. I then address some anticipated objections, including: whether the scientific method selects for anything but approximate truth, the value Stellenbosch of novel predictive success for establishing a theory’s approximate truth and, lastly, the threat of epistemic relativism. Ultimately, this thesis is intended to argue against classical scientific realism and the role approximate truth plays in its explanation for predictive success. The deliberate design argument is intended as an antirealist alternative for predictive success that does not require our theories to be approximately true of the external world. AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis bied ek 'n antirealistiese, nie-waarheidsgebaseerde weergawe vir die voorspellingsukses van die wetenskap. Dit is in direkte kontras met klassieke wetenskaplike realisme, waarin voorspellingsukses toegeskryf word daaraan dat wetenskaplike teorieë naastenby waar is. Ek begin deur 'n oorsig te gee van die geskiedenis van wetenskaplike realisme, die rol van die geenwonderwerke-argument en verskeie punte van kritiek op wetenskaplike realisme. Die kritiek sluit béíde tradisionele antirealistiese argumente teen realisme, soos die onderbepaling van teorie deur bewyse, en meer kontemporêre kritiek, soos die basiskoersdwaling, in. Na aanleiding van hierdie kritiek, begin ek om 'n alternatief vir 'n waarheidsgebaseerde weergawe vir voorspellingsukses uiteen te sit. In plaas daarvan om aan te voer dat ons teorieë naastenby waar is, stel ek voor dat die wetenskaplike metode self as 'n soort kognitiewe hulpmiddel optree. Ek definieer wat 'n kognitiewe hulpmiddel is en verduidelik hoe dit kan ontwikkel aan die hand van drie teorieë: radikale konstruktivisme, evolusionêre epistemologie en pragmatisme. Ek argumenteer dat die wetenskaplike metode as kognitiewe hulpmiddel nie daarop gemik is omnaastenby-waar teorieë te lewer nie, maar eerder om teorieë te lewer wat ons in staat stel daartoe om die eksterne wêreld op betroubare wyses oorsaaklik te kan beïnvloed. Nadat ek hierdie potensieel alternatiewe verduideliking vir die voorspellingsukses van wetenskap daargestel het, brei ek uit op wat ek die “opsetlike-ontwerp-argument” noem. Ek onderskei dit van ander antirealistiese posisies, spesifiek van Fraassen se konstruktiewe empirisme en surrealisme. Ek stel dan die metafisiese, epistemologiese en semantiese standpunte van hierdie verduideliking vir voorspellingsukses vas. Metafisies argumenteer ek dat die verstand-onafhanklike wêreld hoofsaaklik kousaal toeganklik is. Epistemies argumenteer ek dat ons kan weet ons teorieë kan lei tot voorspellingsukses, maar Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za níé of hulle byna waar is nie. Semanties argumenteer ek dat die hoofdoel van teorieë is om reproduseerbare stappe te verskaf om suksesvol die eksterne wêreld oorsaaklike te beïnvloed. Ek spreek dan 'n paar verwagte besware aan, insluitend: of die wetenskaplike metode vir enigiets anders as benaderde waarheid selekteer, die waarde van nuwe voorspellingsukses vir die vasstelling van 'n teorie se benaderde waarheid en, laastens, die bedreiging wat epistemiese relativisme vir my teorie mag inhou. Uiteindelik stel ek ten doel om te argumenteer teen klassieke wetenskaplike realisme en die rol wat benaderde waarheid in die verduideliking daarvan vir voorspellingsukses speel. Die opsetlike-ontwerp-argument word as 'n antirealistiese alternatief vir voorspellingsukses gestel wat nie vereis dat ons teorieë naastenby van die eksterne wêreld waar is nie. Masters 2023-07-03T08:14:55Z 2024-01-08T10:49:44Z 2023-07-03T08:14:55Z 2024-01-08T10:49:44Z 2023-07 Thesis https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/128778 en_ZA en_ZA Stellenbosch University 95 pages application/pdf Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| spellingShingle | Anti-realism Constructive realism Knowledge, Theory of Surrealism Knoetze, Fred The deliberate design argument for the predictive success of science |
| title | The deliberate design argument for the predictive success of science |
| title_full | The deliberate design argument for the predictive success of science |
| title_fullStr | The deliberate design argument for the predictive success of science |
| title_full_unstemmed | The deliberate design argument for the predictive success of science |
| title_short | The deliberate design argument for the predictive success of science |
| title_sort | deliberate design argument for the predictive success of science |
| topic | Anti-realism Constructive realism Knowledge, Theory of Surrealism |
| url | https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/128778 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT knoetzefred thedeliberatedesignargumentforthepredictivesuccessofscience AT knoetzefred deliberatedesignargumentforthepredictivesuccessofscience |