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Islamist Insurgency in Northern Nigeria, 2009–2020
Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2024.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
2025
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| _version_ | 1867613938391187456 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Jacobs, David Jacobus Francois |
| author2 | Jordaan, Evert |
| author_browse | Jacobs, David Jacobus Francois Jordaan, Evert |
| author_facet | Jordaan, Evert Jacobs, David Jacobus Francois |
| author_sort | Jacobs, David Jacobus Francois |
| collection | Thesis |
| dc_rights_str_mv | Stellenbosch University |
| description | Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2024. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/131678 |
| institution | Stellenbosch University (South Africa) |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:44:05.289Z |
| license_str | Other — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from SUNScholar — Stellenbosch University Repository |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publishDateRange | 2025 |
| publishDateSort | 2025 |
| publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| publisherStr | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | SUNScholar — Stellenbosch University Repository |
| spelling | oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/131678 Islamist Insurgency in Northern Nigeria, 2009–2020 Jacobs, David Jacobus Francois Jordaan, Evert Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies. Dept. of Department of Strategic Studies (Mil). Boko Haram Insurgency -- Nigeria -- 21st century Nigeria. Nigerian Army Jonathan, Patience, 1957 Buhari, Muhammadu Nigeria -- Politics and government -- 2007- Heads of State -- Nigeria -- Interviews Boko Haram -- Violence against Terrorism -- Nigeria -- Prevention Terrorism -- Nigeria UCTD Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2024. ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As of 2023, the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria has been ongoing for approximately 13 years. Compared to other instances of insurgency during and since the Cold War, the Boko Haram insurgency has proven exceptionally violent and essentially intractable. The aim of this study is to understand how the strategic thought of the main actors in the conflict have contributed to this brutality and intractability. In this study, strategic thought is defined as the beliefs and assumptions underlying actors’ strategic practice, that is, the use of force to achieve politically defined goals. In discussions about the state, the study broadly focuses on strategic thought in the presidential administrations of Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2015) and Muhammadu Buhari (2015–2023) and the Nigerian Armed Forces. The discussion about insurgent actors distinguishes between Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād – the name Boko Haram used internally under Abubakar Shekau – and the Islamic State of West Africa Province, which splintered from Shekau’s faction in 2016. The key distinction that emerges between the strategic thought of these two militant groups concerns their approach to the balance between the use of coercion and legitimation. Whereas Shekau’s faction showed little regard for legitimation, the Islamic State of West Africa Province has proven deeply concerned with gaining legitimacy in the pockets of territory they control. Overall, insurgent strategic practice has been leveraged by significant material support from the Islamic State, adaptable income structures in both rural and urban areas, and the absence of state security structures in rural regions. The strategic capacity of the state, however, has been reduced by a legitimacy deficit in rural regions, inadequate training in irregular warfare, pervasive corruption, tension between the federal and state-level governments, inadequate criminal justice structures, and ineffective security policies. The study finds that due to the actors’ strategic thought, given various contextual challenges, the first phase of the conflict (2010–2015) was characterised by a self-reinforcing spiral of violence. The second to fourth phases of the conflict (2016–2021) are found to have drawn to a stalemate of forces that gave advantage to the insurgency. The main strategic drivers behind this spiral of violence and stalemate are attributed to the actors' inability to achieve decisive victories and the reinforced anticipation of future violence. It is argued that strategic thought in the state is deeply historicist and fundamentally concerns the maintenance of the physical unity of the country: a peace characterised by the non-resistance of the population rather than the population’s political contentment. The study finally argues that until state strategic thought can move away from the entrenched belief of creating peace through enough overwhelming force, reinvesting the conflict’s violent dividends, it is unlikely to achieve a sustainable peace. AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Boko Haram-insurgensie in Noord-Nigerië duur al sowat 13 jaar sedert 2010. In vergelyking met ander gevalle van post-Koue Oorlog-insurgensie, is die Boko Haram-insurgensie buitengewoon gewelddadig en langdurig. Die doel van hierdie studie is om te verduidelik hoe die strategiese denke van die belangrikste rolspelers tot uitgerektheid en wreedaardigheid van die konflik bygedra het. Strategiese denke in hierdie studie word gedefinieer as die denke en oortuigings wat die strategiese praktyk van rolspelers onderlê om politieke doelwitte te bereik. In die bespreking oor die staat, fokus die studie breedweg op strategiese denke in die presidensiële administrasies van Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2015), Muhammadu Buhari (2015–2023) en die Nigeriese Weermag. Die bespreking oor die insurgente tref 'n onderskeid tussen Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād, die naam wat Boko Haram intern gebruik het onder Abubakar Shekau, en die Islamitiese Staat van Wes-Afrika Provinsie, wat in 2016 van Shekau se faksie weggebreek het. Die verskille tussen die strategiese denke van hierdie twee militante groepe, het veral betrekking op hul benadering tot die balans in hul gebruik van dwang en legitimiteit. Terwyl die Shekau-faksie min oorweging aan legitimiteit skenk, was die Islamitiese Staat van Wes-Afrika Provinsie diep besorg oor hul legitimiteit in die gebiede wat hulle beheer. Oor die algemeen word die strategiese praktyke van die insurgente deur materiële ondersteuning van die Islamitiese Staat, aanpasbare inkomstestrukture in beide landelike en stedelike gebiede, en die afwesigheid van sekuriteitstrukture in landelike streke, aangevuur. Die kapasiteit van die staat is verminder deur 'n tekort aan legitimiteit in landelike gebiede, gebrekkige teen-insurgensie opleiding, korrupsie, spanning tussen die federale en provinsiale regerings, wanfunksionele regstrukture, en ‘n ondoeltreffende veiligheidsbeleid. Die studie bevind dat weens die strategiese denke van die rolspelers, is die eerste fase van die konflik (2010–2015) deur 'n selfversterkende spiraal van geweld, gekenmerk. Verdermeer, die tweede tot vierde fases van die konflik (2016–2021) het tot 'n dooiepunt gelei wat voordeel aan die insurgensie verleen het. Die belangrikste strategiese drywers van die geweld en dooiepunt word aan die onvermoë van die rolspelers om beslissende oorwinnings te behaal toegeskryf, en die groeiende verwagtinge van toekomstige geweld. Daar word aangevoer dat die strategiese denke in die staat diep histories van aard is ten einde die eenheid van die land te verseker: 'n vrede wat gekenmerk word deur die nie-geweldadigheid van die bevolking eerder as politiese tevredenheid. Die studie voer uiteindelik aan dat vrede slegs bereikbaar en volhoubaar is indien die strategiese fokus van die staat om vrede deur oorweldigende geweld te skep, verander word. Masters 2025-02-05T10:09:19Z 2025-02-05T10:09:19Z 2024-12 Thesis https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/131678 en Stellenbosch University xi, 182 pages : illustrations application/pdf Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| spellingShingle | Boko Haram Insurgency -- Nigeria -- 21st century Nigeria. Nigerian Army Jonathan, Patience, 1957 Buhari, Muhammadu Nigeria -- Politics and government -- 2007- Heads of State -- Nigeria -- Interviews Boko Haram -- Violence against Terrorism -- Nigeria -- Prevention Terrorism -- Nigeria UCTD Jacobs, David Jacobus Francois Islamist Insurgency in Northern Nigeria, 2009–2020 |
| title | Islamist Insurgency in Northern Nigeria, 2009–2020 |
| title_full | Islamist Insurgency in Northern Nigeria, 2009–2020 |
| title_fullStr | Islamist Insurgency in Northern Nigeria, 2009–2020 |
| title_full_unstemmed | Islamist Insurgency in Northern Nigeria, 2009–2020 |
| title_short | Islamist Insurgency in Northern Nigeria, 2009–2020 |
| title_sort | islamist insurgency in northern nigeria 2009 2020 |
| topic | Boko Haram Insurgency -- Nigeria -- 21st century Nigeria. Nigerian Army Jonathan, Patience, 1957 Buhari, Muhammadu Nigeria -- Politics and government -- 2007- Heads of State -- Nigeria -- Interviews Boko Haram -- Violence against Terrorism -- Nigeria -- Prevention Terrorism -- Nigeria UCTD |
| url | https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/131678 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jacobsdavidjacobusfrancois islamistinsurgencyinnorthernnigeria20092020 |