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The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2025.

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Main Author: Brink, Jani
Other Authors: De Villiers-Botha, Tanya
Format: Thesis
Language:English
Published: Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University 2025
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access_status_str Open Access
author Brink, Jani
author2 De Villiers-Botha, Tanya
author_browse Brink, Jani
De Villiers-Botha, Tanya
author_facet De Villiers-Botha, Tanya
Brink, Jani
author_sort Brink, Jani
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dc_rights_str_mv Stellenbosch University
description Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2025.
format Thesis
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institution Stellenbosch University (South Africa)
language English
last_indexed 2026-06-10T12:45:28.762Z
license_str Other — see source repository
provenance_str_mv Harvested via OAI-PMH from SUNScholar — Stellenbosch University Repository
publishDate 2025
publishDateRange 2025
publishDateSort 2025
publisher Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
publisherStr Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
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spelling oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/134542 The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation. Brink, Jani De Villiers-Botha, Tanya Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. Philosophy of mind Transplantation of organs, tissues, etc. Identity (Philosophical concept) Brain -- Transplantation -- Moral and ethical aspects Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2025. Brink, J. 2025. The Brain of Theseus: Examining the Physicalist Assumptions of Brain Transplantation. Unpublished masters thesis. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University [online]. Available: https://scholar.sun.ac.za/items/b94c3f6e-46a5-4150-81e0-bcf242c14321 ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Human brain or head transplantation, though typically relegated to the realm of science fiction, could be possible in the near future should one be convinced by the claims of the researchers working to realise the Head Anastomosis Venture (HEAVEN) procedure, a proposed human head transplantation. In addition to a host of concerns relating to the practical feasibility of and the ethical issues related to the procedure, the assumption by the researchers that the person undergoing such a procedure will persist through such a significant alteration of their body should be more closely examined. This is an assumption that is burdened by metaphysical baggage, and it is this thesis’ purpose to examine some of these issues. This thesis argues that the assumption that a person necessarily follows their brain presumes a physicalist account of mind and, therefore, personal identity. As the extent to which this physicalist account is reductive is not clear, reductive and non-reductive physicalist accounts of personal identity are developed respectively. The reductive account synthesises the mind-brain identity theory of mind, the endurantist account of persistence and the physical criterion of personal identity, while the non-reductive account weaves together the functionalist account of mind, the perdurantist approach to persistence and the psychological continuity account of personal identity. Both physicalist accounts are then applied to increasingly complex thought experiments involving brain transplantation cases to test whether they are able to yield intuitive and logically coherent results. In the case of the reductive account, it was found that the account produces untenable and logically puzzling results, indicating that the reductive account is not satisfactory as an underlying assumption regarding ongoing brain transplantation research. The non-reductive account fared better, yielding intuitive results. However, there does appear to be scope for further refinement regarding degreed persistence. Thus, this thesis finds that the brain transplantation researchers’ assumption that the person follows their brain during the transplantation procedure requires some commitment to a non-reductive physicalist account of personal identity and that this, in turn, requires accepting functionalism, perdurantism and the psychological continuity account of personal identity. AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Geen opsomming beskikbaar. Masters 2025-12-12T09:44:43Z 2025-12-12T09:44:43Z 2025-12 Thesis https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/134542 en Stellenbosch University 116 pages application/pdf Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
spellingShingle Philosophy of mind
Transplantation of organs, tissues, etc.
Identity (Philosophical concept)
Brain -- Transplantation -- Moral and ethical aspects
Brink, Jani
The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation.
title The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation.
title_full The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation.
title_fullStr The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation.
title_full_unstemmed The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation.
title_short The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation.
title_sort brain of theseus examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation
topic Philosophy of mind
Transplantation of organs, tissues, etc.
Identity (Philosophical concept)
Brain -- Transplantation -- Moral and ethical aspects
url https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/134542
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