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Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2025.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
2025
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| _version_ | 1867614025691430912 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Brink, Jani |
| author2 | De Villiers-Botha, Tanya |
| author_browse | Brink, Jani De Villiers-Botha, Tanya |
| author_facet | De Villiers-Botha, Tanya Brink, Jani |
| author_sort | Brink, Jani |
| collection | Thesis |
| dc_rights_str_mv | Stellenbosch University |
| description | Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2025. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/134542 |
| institution | Stellenbosch University (South Africa) |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:45:28.762Z |
| license_str | Other — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from SUNScholar — Stellenbosch University Repository |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publishDateRange | 2025 |
| publishDateSort | 2025 |
| publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| publisherStr | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | SUNScholar — Stellenbosch University Repository |
| spelling | oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/134542 The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation. Brink, Jani De Villiers-Botha, Tanya Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. Philosophy of mind Transplantation of organs, tissues, etc. Identity (Philosophical concept) Brain -- Transplantation -- Moral and ethical aspects Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2025. Brink, J. 2025. The Brain of Theseus: Examining the Physicalist Assumptions of Brain Transplantation. Unpublished masters thesis. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University [online]. Available: https://scholar.sun.ac.za/items/b94c3f6e-46a5-4150-81e0-bcf242c14321 ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Human brain or head transplantation, though typically relegated to the realm of science fiction, could be possible in the near future should one be convinced by the claims of the researchers working to realise the Head Anastomosis Venture (HEAVEN) procedure, a proposed human head transplantation. In addition to a host of concerns relating to the practical feasibility of and the ethical issues related to the procedure, the assumption by the researchers that the person undergoing such a procedure will persist through such a significant alteration of their body should be more closely examined. This is an assumption that is burdened by metaphysical baggage, and it is this thesis’ purpose to examine some of these issues. This thesis argues that the assumption that a person necessarily follows their brain presumes a physicalist account of mind and, therefore, personal identity. As the extent to which this physicalist account is reductive is not clear, reductive and non-reductive physicalist accounts of personal identity are developed respectively. The reductive account synthesises the mind-brain identity theory of mind, the endurantist account of persistence and the physical criterion of personal identity, while the non-reductive account weaves together the functionalist account of mind, the perdurantist approach to persistence and the psychological continuity account of personal identity. Both physicalist accounts are then applied to increasingly complex thought experiments involving brain transplantation cases to test whether they are able to yield intuitive and logically coherent results. In the case of the reductive account, it was found that the account produces untenable and logically puzzling results, indicating that the reductive account is not satisfactory as an underlying assumption regarding ongoing brain transplantation research. The non-reductive account fared better, yielding intuitive results. However, there does appear to be scope for further refinement regarding degreed persistence. Thus, this thesis finds that the brain transplantation researchers’ assumption that the person follows their brain during the transplantation procedure requires some commitment to a non-reductive physicalist account of personal identity and that this, in turn, requires accepting functionalism, perdurantism and the psychological continuity account of personal identity. AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Geen opsomming beskikbaar. Masters 2025-12-12T09:44:43Z 2025-12-12T09:44:43Z 2025-12 Thesis https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/134542 en Stellenbosch University 116 pages application/pdf Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy of mind Transplantation of organs, tissues, etc. Identity (Philosophical concept) Brain -- Transplantation -- Moral and ethical aspects Brink, Jani The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation. |
| title | The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation. |
| title_full | The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation. |
| title_fullStr | The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation. |
| title_full_unstemmed | The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation. |
| title_short | The brain of Theseus: examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation. |
| title_sort | brain of theseus examining the physicalist assumptions of brain transplantation |
| topic | Philosophy of mind Transplantation of organs, tissues, etc. Identity (Philosophical concept) Brain -- Transplantation -- Moral and ethical aspects |
| url | https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/134542 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT brinkjani thebrainoftheseusexaminingthephysicalistassumptionsofbraintransplantation AT brinkjani brainoftheseusexaminingthephysicalistassumptionsofbraintransplantation |