Full Text Available
Note: Clicking the button above will open the full text document at the original institutional repository in a new window.
An antidote to excessive optimism: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness cannot be solved
Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2026.
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
2026
|
| Tags: |
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1867613998709473280 |
|---|---|
| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Anker, Francois De Villiers |
| author2 | Msimang, Phila Mfundo |
| author_browse | Anker, Francois De Villiers Msimang, Phila Mfundo |
| author_facet | Msimang, Phila Mfundo Anker, Francois De Villiers |
| author_sort | Anker, Francois De Villiers |
| collection | Thesis |
| dc_rights_str_mv | Stellenbosch University |
| description | Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2026. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/135555 |
| institution | Stellenbosch University (South Africa) |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:45:01.662Z |
| license_str | Other — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from SUNScholar — Stellenbosch University Repository |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| publishDateRange | 2026 |
| publishDateSort | 2026 |
| publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| publisherStr | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | SUNScholar — Stellenbosch University Repository |
| spelling | oai:scholar.sun.ac.za:10019.1/135555 An antidote to excessive optimism: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness cannot be solved Anker, Francois De Villiers Msimang, Phila Mfundo Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy. Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2026. Anker, F. D. V. 2026. An antidote to excessive optimism: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness cannot be solved. Unpublished masters thesis. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University [online]. Available: https://scholar.sun.ac.za/items/ab1074ab-6523-4c95-96ee-8a2634b9b03a Despite the historic success of reductionist scientific practice and its guiding principles, some contemporary theories of consciousness continue to promulgate an anti-physicalist resistance with regards to the phenomenal aspects of subjective consciousness, called ‘Qualia’. According to famous arguments by Joseph Levine (1983) and Frank Jackson (1982), physicalism seemingly fails to account for qualia, bringing about David Chalmers’ (1995) “hard problem of consciousness” – ‘HPC’ hereafter. If such qualia realist arguments are correct, physicalism – which supports our most trusted scientific practices – is incomplete and thus considered false as a general metaphysic by some, arguably indicating the need for a paradigm shift (Frankish, 2016, p. 2). Arguing the contrary, this thesis utilises three responses to the HPC – qualia realism, illusionism and identity theory – as exemplary vehicles for their informing principles. Its aim is not to argue for these specific theories, but rather to argue the comparatively superior efficacy, scientific respectability and theoretical quality of the general physicalist approach. While Daniel Dennett’s (1991 [1993]; 2017a; 2017b) illusionism provides a potential physicalist model of the mind/brain, David Papineau’s (1998) identity theory focuses on analytic aspects, exploring how phenomenal concepts might refer. These theories make it seem possible to account for subjective qualia physically, which many believe should be impossible given the scientific methods demand for objective data. By finding a way to incorporate this seemingly contradictory phenomenon into its scope, physicalism raises suspicion as to the limits of that scope and whether it has any. If the physicalist thesis is able to adapt to a point of allowing any phenomenon into its scope, it would be shown to have no determinate content, rendering it an empty theory with no real knowledge to offer. David Spurrett’s (2017) work argues that physicalism maintains its determinate content despite concerns regarding its seemingly extreme adaptability. In advocating for the general physicalist approach, I aim to suggest a synthesis of these positions – coined ‘alloyed anti-realism’ – founded on their shared principles, producing a sketch of what a preferable reply to the HPC might look like. This position’s argument will be that realism is problematically dualistic, and that the HPC itself is made insoluble by those same dualistic aspects and the anti-physicalist elements their reality would require. This thesis advocates for physicalist principles, with particular emphasis laid on the claim that their superiority over those of realism would have been evident since 1998. Much of the new literature on consciousness has served merely to convolute rather than clarify. I believe this to be a result of foundational issues, chief among which are the dualist implications of qualia realism. Therefore, we might benefit from revisiting its origins. By looking at the foundational texts of this discussion, I aim to unveil the roots of the issues we continue to struggle with today and so show that the relevant questions were simply set up in a way that refuses scientific solution. Arguing this should provide what we need to make evident the unreasonableness of qualia realism, via my ‘Pre-split Argument’. Simultaneously, by providing promising physicalist answers to the HPC, I aim to make clear the prematurity of the realists going beyond physics, via my ‘Prematurity Argument’. With these arguments – and their informative physicalist models – in place, we can compare the suggested alloyed theory’s potential to that of realism using a measurement of theoretical quality developed by Keas (2018). Opting for an objective measurement like this should serve to keep what has become an extremely convoluted debate on track. If our alloyed example beats out realism in this comparison, it should be clear that the principles of physicalism are far more promising than those of the realist position, and that this superiority would have been evident for almost 30 years. Masters 2026-04-01T11:51:09Z 2026-04-01T11:51:09Z 2026-03 Thesis https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/135555 en Stellenbosch University 112 pages application/pdf Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University |
| spellingShingle | Anker, Francois De Villiers An antidote to excessive optimism: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness cannot be solved |
| title | An antidote to excessive optimism: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness cannot be solved |
| title_full | An antidote to excessive optimism: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness cannot be solved |
| title_fullStr | An antidote to excessive optimism: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness cannot be solved |
| title_full_unstemmed | An antidote to excessive optimism: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness cannot be solved |
| title_short | An antidote to excessive optimism: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness cannot be solved |
| title_sort | antidote to excessive optimism why the hard problem of consciousness cannot be solved |
| url | https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/135555 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ankerfrancoisdevilliers anantidotetoexcessiveoptimismwhythehardproblemofconsciousnesscannotbesolved AT ankerfrancoisdevilliers antidotetoexcessiveoptimismwhythehardproblemofconsciousnesscannotbesolved |