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Egyptian Public Economic Policies Between the Supreme Constitutional Court and the State
To fully understand the present, it is useful to trace the past. The relationship between the rule of law and economic development has been a significant topic in the literature. In the 1960s, it was believed that economic development required regulated markets in which the state played an active ro...
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AUC Knowledge Fountain
2025
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| Summary: | To fully understand the present, it is useful to trace the past. The relationship between the rule of law and economic development has been a significant topic in the literature. In the 1960s, it was believed that economic development required regulated markets in which the state played an active role. However, when it became evident that the state's involvement in the economy yielded few of the promised benefits, economic neoliberalism emerged. This involved the state withdrawing from the economy and allowing the market to take the lead. Still, the state must govern the institutional conditions necessary for the markets. These institutional conditions often included constitutional guarantees and an independent judiciary equipped with judicial review. The case of Egypt exemplifies these stages. This paper highlights the various economic approaches that Egypt has adopted since the 1952 Free Officers Revolution until Mubarak’s era, focusing on the emergence of Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) as a new actor in the economic and political spheres. Although the state relied on the SCC to promote some of its most controversial economic policies, things did not proceed as intended. In some instances, the Court’s ideology exceeded what was tolerable, leaving the regime struggling to align itself and eventually leading to its efforts to undermine the Court. This paper examines the Court's and the regime's different responses regarding economic policies throughout the 1990s. It argues that while the regime considered the Court an ally in economic liberalism, the Court’s ideological approach went too far, prompting the state to initiate a project to weaken it. |
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